Furthermore, Goodhart (1993) suggests that with the growth of wholesale
money markets and liability management, the distinction between situations of
illiquidity and conditions of insolvency has been erased in such a way that the
central bank’s role as lender of last resort involves a serious risk of loss. He also
warns that, in today’s more competitive conditions, a central bank would find it
increasingly hard to persuade banks to join in and share the burden of potential
loss from the rescue of an insolvent bank. He concludes, ‘this could lead to
serious problem for central banks. They may not have sufficient funds of their
own … to accept the potential losses involved in a future rescue exercise’
(Goodhart, 1993, p. 421). Here, the expression of liquidity preference for the
central bank operates through the amount of funds made available to banks. For
the central bank, the decision to place funds with the ‘risk-insolvent’ bank
involves the creation of new debts (i.e. change in the size of its portfolio). When
liquidity preference rises, the central bank is less willing to face a potentially
large insolvency problem, and there is no alternative but the partial or total
intervention of the government.
Credit-money is endogenous folks. The Fed can set the rate, but it's ultimately up to people and banks whether or not to lend. And reducing interest rates is not the way to do it - not when there are so many outstanding debts and in the midst of economic malaise.
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