Why Can't We Be Friends: Post-Keynesians and Austrians

I've been thinking about something lately, and it has to do with what I believe to be a significant overlap in the theories of Post-keynesian economics and Austrian economics. They both have radically different prescriptions, but their rhetoric is very similar.

Austrians blame the monopoly power of the Federal Reserve fractional system for artificially keeping interest rates low, in the presence of economic uncertainty, causing mal-investment and credit bubbles that eventually crash.

Post-Keynesians blame the failure of the private markets for engaging in increasingly speculative and illegal behaviors, in the presence of economic uncertainty, at various times, causing unsustainable investment and credit bubbles that eventually crash.

Similar talk yet all I hear from post-Keynesians is how 'off base' the Austrians are about the endogeneity of credit money. In fact though, while money creation to fund a bubble may indeed be demand driven, the fact nevertheless remains that it is the Fed that accommodates that demand to maintain an interest rate target. Post-Keynesians tend to focus their efforts at regulating the private banking practices but don't spend much time thinking about how the Fed itself may need to be regulated.

Similar talk yet all I hear from the Austrians is almost a disturbing fervor to get the government out of everything - including money. Go on the gold standard, have a 100% reserve requirement, reduce systematic risks in our financial system thereby reducing the likelihood of mal-ivestement. In fact though, the private market is at least equal to be blamed for their own 'irrationality'. The Austrians, opposite the post-Keynesians, think that all can be solved by changing the nature of the Fed (or elimination of it's power altogether).

Point is, even though the two schools blame different things or focus on what may be considered divergent prescriptions, the meat of their analysis are markedly similar. The focus on uncertainty and on credit booms and busts seem to be really two sides of a similar coin. And by the way, there is no logic that suggests both couldn't be a little bit 'correct.' After all, the private market would likely be less likely to fail if the Fed didn't accommodate its failures, but focusing just on the Fed ignores the larger systematic problem of private market failures and excessive risk taking (or perhaps perversely, the Austrian prescription ensures too little risk be taken).

Ok, so maybe friendship is too much to ask for, but Post-Keynesians and Austrians, in the interest of being true pluralists, could at least learn from each other